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Abstract. Proof-of-Space provides an intriguing alternative for consen-
sus protocol of permissionless blockchains due to its recyclable nature
and the potential to support multiple chains simultaneously. However, a
direct shared proof of the same storage, which was adopted in the ex-
isting multi-chain schemes based on Proof-of-Space, could give rise to
newborn attack on new chain launching. To fix this gap, we propose an
innovative framework of single-chain Proof-of-Space and further present
a novel multi-chain scheme which can resist newborn attack effectively
by elaborately combining shared proof and chain-specific proof of stor-
age. Moreover, we analyze the security of the multi-chain scheme and
prove that it is incentive-compatible. This means that participants in
such multi-chain system can achieve their greatest utility with our pro-
posed strategy of storage resource partition.
Keywords: Blockchain · Mechanism Design · Consensus · Cryptocur-
rency · Proof-of-Space
1 Introduction
Since the proposal of Bitcoin in 2008 [1], blockchain has been successfully pro-
viding a decentralized consensus on a distributive ledger in a permissionless en-
vironment through a peer-to-peer network. In a high level, blockchain is a chain
of blocks, each containing certain linearly ordered transactions. The consensus of
blockchain performs a “leader election” process and a “ledger extension” process
for each round. The “leader election” process elects one or few leaders from all
consensus participants (known as miners) according to their computing power,
and then these leaders perform a “ledger extension” process via appending their
proposed blocks to the rear of the blockchain. Since the specific computing power
is evaluated by having miners work on finding certain hash functions preimages,
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the corresponding authors. The research is supported by the National Natural Sci-
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such a way of leader election is called Proof-of-Work (PoW) [2]. The computing
power of conducting PoW is referred to as hash power.
PoW consensus scheme suffers from notorious consumption of hash power
which turns out to be a waste of natural resource. This circumstances has acti-
vated the investigation of alternative consensus schemes which are more energy-
efficient. An alternative consensus scheme is Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [3–9]. In the
“leader election” process of PoS consensus scheme, the leader is randomly se-
lected proportionally to the stake that each miner holds, rather than the hash
power. Another alternative to PoW is Proof-of-Space (aka. Proof-of-Capacity,
PoC). In PoC consensus, the one-time consumption of hash power is replaced by
the holding of the storage resource, namely, recyclable hardware disks. Also, PoC
is inherited with a nature of concurrency by providing resource proof for multiple
chains simultaneously. With a shared nonce for the pebbling graph [10–12] (PG,
the building block of most existing PoC-based consensus schemes), the claim on
the same storage can be applied to the consensus of more than one PG-based
blockchain. With such a shared proof of storage, the same storage contributes
to the security of multiple chains – less total resource is required for the same
security guarantee globally.
However, a direct shared proof of the same storage brings about newborn
attack, which makes new chains hard to launch since holders of large storage
pools may attack a newly started chain with almost zero-cost (it needs only
to duplicate the proof one more time). In this paper, we aim to address this
issue by proposing an innovative multi-chain scheme of proof-of-space based on
the SpaceMint [13] protocol. This scheme is built on a combination of a shared
proof and a chain-specific proof of storage, which makes the same storage source
contributes simultaneously to multiple blockchains, and the cost for an adversary
to launch a newborn attack is enormous. Moreover, we prove that our scheme is
incentive-compatible, which means participants can achieve their greatest utility
with our desired strategy of storage resource partition.
1.1 Related Works
Two recent works [14, 15]both proposed their “Proof-of-Space” protocol. Their
main difference is whether the proofs are for transient storage or persistent stor-
age. Proof of transient space(PoTS) by Ateniese et al. [14] enables efficient ver-
ification of memory-hard function [16], which is a function that needs a lot of
space to compute. In this work, a verifier only needs O(poly logS) time and
space to verify the claimed space usage of the prover, where S is the amount
of storage the prover P wants to dedicate. Proof of persistent space(PoPS) by
Dziembowski et. al. [15] allows the verifier to repeatedly audit the prover. Only
prover who stores the data persistently can pass the repeatedly audit.
Proof of retrievability(PoR) [17] allows a user who outsources some useful
data to an untrusted server to repeatedly verify if the data is still existing in
the server. The difference between PoPS and PoR is whether a large amount of
initial data is transferred from verifier V to prover P.
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Previous PoC constructions only differ in the pebbling graphs G . Dziem-
bowski et. al. [15] proposed two constructions of PoC schemes in the random
oracle model, using Merkle tree and graphs with high “pebbling complexity”.
One is based on a graph with high pebbling complexity by Paul et. al. [18], which
is (Θ(S/ log S), S/ logS,∞)-secure (see definition in Sec. 2.2). Another one com-
bines superconcentrators [19–21], random bipartite expander graphs [22,23] and
depth robust graphs [24, 25] and is
(Θ(S),∞, Θ(S))-secure
The construction of Ren and Devadas [26] uses stacked bipartite expander
graphs, which is
(α · S, (1− α) · S,∞)-secure
for any α ∈ [0, 0.5]. The labels of the graph are computed just as in [15], however
the prover only stores the labels on top of this stack.
The construction of Krzysztof Pietrzak [27] uses depth-robust graphs from
[16] to realize PoC, which is
(S · (1− ǫ),∞, S)-secure
This construction has a tight bound, which means it can get security against
adversary storing (1 − ǫ) fraction of the space. Moreover, this construction gets
security against parallelism, which implies massive parallelism of oracle queries
doesn’t benefit the adversary. Besides, this work also introduces and constructs
a new type of PoC, which allows the prover to store useful data at the same
time.
1.2 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces notations,
building blocks and the background of PoC. Sec. 3 presents a single-chain PoC
scheme built on SpaceMint – one of the most well-known PoC scheme today.
Based on this, in Sec. 4, we describe our framework for the multi-chain PoC
scheme both by a general functionality and a specific protocol realizing one case
of the functionality. Finally, we analyze the incentive compatibility and security
of our framework in Sec. 5.
2 Backgrounds
2.1 Notations
For a set S, |S| denotes the number of elements in S. With “||” we denote con-
catenation of strings. More generally, for any two tuples m1,m2, m1 ◦m2 is
the concatenation of them and for unary tuple m1 = (m), m1 ◦m2 is written
as m ◦ m2 (same to the case of m2 = (m)). We ideally assume N partici-
pants and refer to them by either identities (P1, P2, . . . , PN ) or their public keys
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(pk1, pk2, . . . , pkN ) interchangeably. The secret key corresponding to a public
key pk is denoted as pk−1 for simplicity. To further facilitate our description of
a high-level framework. We assume a public-key infrastructure (PKI) among all
participants, which is described by a functionality Fcert. Moreover, to any tuple
of messages (m0,m1, . . . ,mℓ), we use (m0,m1, . . . ,mℓ)pk−1 to signify the tuple
along with the valid signature on the tuple hash from the participant of public
key pk. In later descriptions, we may take the necessity of signing and verify-
ing as granted and avoid redundant descriptions. We assume a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ simulating the random oracle [28]. Note that based on H ,
we can build Hz for any message z as Hz(·) := H(z||·) [29].
2.2 Proof-of-Space
Proof-of-space is an interactive protocol between a prover P and a verifier V
that demonstrates the prover P is storing some data of a certain size. The PoC
protocol in [15] involves two phases: initialization phase and execution phase.
Initialization is an interactive process between the prover P and the verifier
V. It runs on shared inputs (id, S). id is an identifier to assure that the prover
P cannot reuse the same disk space to run PoC for different statement. S is the
amount of storage the prover P wants to dedicate. After the initialization phase,
P stores some data F , whereas V only stores a commitment γ to F.
Execution is an interactive process between the prover P and the verifier V.
The prover P runs on data F and the verifier V runs on input γ. Then the verifier
V sends challenges to the prover P, obtains back the corresponding openings. At
the end V verifies these openings and outputs accept or reject.
The security of a PoC protocol was formally defined in [15]. Specifically, a
(S0, S1, T )-adversarial prover Pˆ was defined, which means Pˆ’s storage after the
initialization phase is bounded by S0, while during the execution phase it runs
in storage at most S1 and time at most T . Secure PoC protocols are required to
have three properties, which are completeness, soundness and efficiency.
1. Completeness: We say a PoC protocol has completeness if the verifier always
outputs accept for any honest prover P with probability 1.
2. Soundness: We say a PoC protocol has soundness if the verifier V outputs
accept with a negligible probability for any (S0, S1, T )-adversarial prover Pˆ .
3. Efficiency: We say a PoC protocol has efficiency if the verifier V can run in
time O(poly logS).
We say that a PoC protocol is (S0, S1, T )-secure if the above three properties
are satisfied.
3 Single-Chain Proof-of-Space
In this section, we use SpaceMint protocol as the building block of our multi-
chain protocol to be described in the latter section.
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3.1 Graph Labeling Game
At first, we introduce the graph labeling game [30, 31].
Definition 1 (Graph Labelling).We consider a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
G = (V,E) ,which has a vertex set V = {0, 1, . . . , S − 1} and a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, the label li ∈ {0, 1}
λ for each vertex i ∈ V is recursively
computed as li = H(nc, i, lp1 , ..., lpt) where lp1 , ..., lpt are the parents of vertex i
and nc is a unique nonce.
Graph labeling game is the building block of most PoC protocols. Let G = (V,E)
be a directed acyclic graph (DAG) which has S nodes . H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
is a collision-resistant hash function. For every id, a fresh hash function can be
sampled: Hid = H(id||·). The PoC protocol based on the graph labeling game is
as follows:
1. Initialization: First, P computes the labels on all nodes of G using graph
labelling, and commits to them in γ using Merkle-tree Commitment. Then
P gets q challenges from V. For each of the challenges C = (C1, ..., Cq),
P opens the label on the Cthi node of G, as same as the labels of all its
parent nodes. Finally, V checks the openings of all challenge nodes and their
parents. V also checks if the challenge nodes are computed correctly from
their parents.
2. Execution: V chooses t challenge nodes randomly. Then P sends the opening
of these challenge nodes to V. This execution phase can be done repeatedly.
3.2 PoC Definition
Before introducing how to apply any PoC schemes to blockchains, we introduce
the formal description of a PoC at first designed to apply between two parties.
A PoC scheme built on a hash oracle H is described as ΠPoC = (init, open, vrf).
Specifically,
Space Commitment. ΠPoC.init
H(S) → (γ, γ˜) inputs the size of the pebbling
graph and returns a pair (γ, γ˜) after building up the graph where γ is the
commitment released to the publicity and γ˜ is a secret to be locally stored.
Commitment Opening. ΠPoC.open
H(S, γ˜, C) → τ takes as input the graph
size, the threshold γ˜, the challenge C and returns a proof τ .
Verification. ΠPoC.vrf
H(S, γ, C, τ)→ {accept, reject} verifies a proof τ for the
challenge C to the graph of size S and public commitment γ.
3.3 SpaceMint
In SpaceMint [13], the structure of blocks is identical to Bitcoin blockchain except
for containing a space proof instead of a hash solution. Furthermore, the detailed
protocol of SpaceMint is similar to any blockchain, in spite that the mining
and chain-competition differ from that of PoW-based blockchains. Thereby, it is
too redundant to cover every details to introduce the full scheme. To describe
SpaceMint, we only need to enumerate all the difference between SpaceMint and
the ordinary blockchain.
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s0
s1
s2
. . .
sM
Fig. 1. Capacity Resource Partition
Initial Step. For a miner to dedicate λN bits of storage to the blockchain
network, it computes and stores the labels of their pebbling graph to get
(γ, γ˜)← ΠPoC.init
H(S) at the initial stage. Afterwards sctx = (pk, γ)pk−1 is
broadcast to the network.
The Mining. Each miner maintains a main chain (the chain branch with the
greatest total weight) in its view. We denote the chain as (A1, A2, . . . , Ai−1)
and their corresponding proofs as τ1, τ2, ..., τ i−1 (i ≥ ∆). To mine the next
block Ai, the miner at first derives the challenge for block i from the proof
of block i−∆, i.e., Ci = H(τi−∆) mod S. Thereby, the miner obtains τ ←
ΠPoC.open
H(S, γ˜, Ci) and assembles Ai with τ . This differs from PoW.
Block Verification. Different from the nonce verification in the existing blockchain,
we in SpaceMint should check the open-up τ of each block by ΠPoC.vrf
H(S, γ, C, τ).
Chain Weight. Assuming a block is followed bym sequential blocks (A1, A2, . . . , Am),
which have valid proofs τ1, τ2, ..., τm respectively, and that the correspond-
ing space contributed by these miners are S1, S2, ..., Sm. The weight of Ai is
defined as follows:
weight(Ai) = (
H(τ i)
2λ
)1/S
i
It can be proved that the probability that Ai has the largest weight among
these m blocks equals to his fraction of the total space, which is S
i∑
m
k=1 S
k .
In this way, in a chain competition, the chain branch with the greatest total
weight outruns the others. This differs from the existing blockchain where
the block weight is atomic (either one or zero).
4 A Multi-Chain scheme
In this section, we introduce our framework for the multi-chain scheme of proof-
of-space. To this end, we first describe our high-level functionality and then
propose one possible realization of the functionality based on the aforementioned
SpaceMint-based single-chain protocol.
4.1 Functionalities
In a high level, as Fig. 1, we expect to have all participants pay half of the
total storage for purchasing the upper bound of their admissible storage (the
shared proof part, denoted as s0), and allocate the rest half of storage on each
supportive chains respectively according to their market weight (si for chain i).
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Functionality Gmain
Shared functionality Gmain interacts with all participants P1, P2, . . . , PN , the environ-
ment Z, as well as a public-key infrastructure Fcert and a publicly shared global clock
functionality GCLOCK.
This functionality is parameterized by the number of candidates N (this is a variant
in the permissionless setting, but we take this notation for the simplicity of descrip-
tions), the number of adversary controlled parties t. A predetermined parameter lsize
describes the number of leaders to be elected for a round which varies among different
emulations of the functionality. The ledger ledgerk := ǫ of each chain k ∈ [M ] is a
linearly ordered list of transactions initially set as empty.
Each round (round R) proceeds as follows.
– Leader Election.
• Querying each participant Pi for its resource partition s
i = (si0, s
i
1, . . . , s
i
M ).
• For each i ∈ [N ] and k ∈ [M ], calculate weightki := w(s
i,B, k).
• For each j ∈ [lsize] and k ∈ [M ], pick leaderkj from {Pi}i∈[N] randomly such that
leaderkj = Pi for each participant Pi with the probability proportional to weight
k
i .
– Ledger Extension.
• For each chain k ∈ [M ], fetch from the environment Z a tuple of transactions
{txiR,k}i∈[ℓ], sort them into a linear list txR,k.
• For each chain k ∈ [M ], extend the ledger by appending txR,k into its rear ledgerk :=
ledgerk ⊕ txR,k.
– Reward Issuing.
• For each chain k ∈ [M ], let txrewardR,k := (tx
k
leader1
, txkleader2 , . . . , tx
k
leaderlsize
) where each
txkleaderj is a specially formed transaction that allocates
rewardkR+ℓ×fee
lsize
to leaderk,j .
• For each chain k ∈ [M ], issue rewards and transaction fees to leaders by appending
txrewardR,k to the ledger ledgerk := ledgerk ⊕ tx
reward
R,k .
• Pend till the global time clock GCLOCK issuing the end of the round R := R + 1.
Fig. 2. The Main Functionality
Specifically, to a chain i with βi =
Bi
||B|| (Bi is the sum of si for all participants)
fraction of total storage proof, we stimulate the participant to allocate si = βis0
storage on it. To allow for the start-up of new chains, we in actual ask that
si ≤ (1+ δ)βis0. Clearly, as an equilibrium of economics, the total storage proof
behind a blockchain is proportional to the total market weight of the chain.
Therefore, the market weight of each chain is described by the total storage
proof behind the chain. Also, we assume that the amount of released coins and
transaction fees is the same to all chains for each round and hence the per-coin
value is proportional to our defined market weight.
In all, our system supports M different PoC-based blockchains. Each (jth) of
them elects leaders according to sij . Specifically, each miner (i
th) has the chance
of being the leader of each round by
w(s,B, k) :=
{
sk
Bk+sk
, sk ≤ (1 + δ)β
′
ks0
s˜k
Bk+s˜k
, otherwise
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where B′k := Bk + sk, β
′ := B
′
||B′|| , and s˜k := maxsk{sk ≤ (1 + δ)β
′
ks0}. The
exact formula of sk is easy to uncover by solving a quadratic equation (hence
can be described in codes when implemented). However, we remain the current
formulation for readability. To facilitate proofs in later sections, we observe that
ψB,k(s) := w(s,B, k) is continuous on (R
+)M+1 and is smooth almost every-
where (a.e.) on (R+)M+1 except for {s ∈ (R+)M+1|sk = (1+ δ)β
′
ks0} with zero
Lebesgue-measure for each k ∈ [M ].
The detailed description of the functionality is shown in Fig. 2, where we aim
to provide a framework more general than our specific way of realization so the
size of leaders to be elected for each round is parameterized by lsize. In fact, lsize
of most existing blockchains and our realization based on SpaceMint is simply
1.
4.2 A Protocol for lsize = 1
To build our realization of the above functionality with lsize = 1 based on our
SpaceMint-based single-chain PoC protocol in the previous section, most steps
are natural implementations of our building block. However, few issues should be
carefully considered alongside. To establish a commonly verifiable computation
on the market weight B in a decentralized environment, we assume that the
market weight of each chain is proportional to the summed weight of latest ∆
consequent blocks by a constant factor µ. To make sure that each space proof
is used for only one identity, there should be a pool Γ of space commits locally
store in each node. We have put the specific protocol in Fig. 3 since details are
not crucial to the roadmap of our paper.
5 Framework Analysis
The realization of our functionality in Fig. 2 should satisfy both safety and live-
ness. The analysis of basic safety and liveness is specific to the way of realization.
In our protocol to realize the functionality with lsize = 1, the basic safety and
liveness properties of the realization are inherited from SpaceMint. In this sec-
tion, we focus on two higher-leveled properties of our general framework for a
PoC multi-chain future, namely, incentive compatibility and the system security
that a considerable fraction of global storage resource has to be held by an ad-
versary to devastate any chain under the framework, even for newly launched
chains or chains with the least market weight.
5.1 Incentive Compatibility
In this part, we prove that our framework is incentive-compatible. Namely, par-
ticipants achieve their greatest utility (the most expected revenue) with our
desired strategy of storage resource partition. Without loss of generality, we
consider δ = 0 to simplify our proofs. Also, we assume β′ = β from time to time
to simplify proofs. To begin with, we formally describe the partition strategy.
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Definition 2 (Capacity Resource Partition). For each participant with to-
tal capacity c, all its admissible resource partitions form the space DM+1c ⊂
(R+)M+1 that
∑M
i=0 si = c for each s = (s0, s1, . . . , sM ) ∈ D
M+1
c . Furthermore,
we introduce DM+1 := ∪c∈R+D
M+1
c .
Likewise, we denote DM1 as the set of vectors (β1, β2, . . . , βM ) ⊂ (R
+)M of
length M that
∑M
i=0 βi = 1.
The utility function is a mapping from a partition strategy to the expected
revenue for each round. To define the global utility function, we firstly introduce
the chain-specific utility function.
Definition 3 (Chain-Specific Utility Function). The chain-specific utility
function for chain k is
val(s,B, k) := r × w(s,B, k)× ωBk.
Intuitively, r is a positive constant, w(s,B, k) (proportionally) describes the
probability of becoming the leader of each round, and the per-coin value of chain
k is proportional to the market weight of the chain (hence is ωBk for a positive
constant ω). Note that we have assume that the minted coins and transaction
fees are the same for each chain and for each round, hence it is not a necessity
to add in another factor for it in the multiplication.
At a first glance, the formula above seems fit only into the scenario of lsize = 1.
Actually, in the multi-leader case, each participant has lsize times the chance to
become an leader while each leader has only 1
lsize
fraction of total revenue. By
lsize·sk
B′[k] ·
r
lsize
· ωB′k =
sk
B′
k
· r · ωB′k, the expected revenue remains identical to the
one-leader case.
Definition 4 (The Utility Function). Thereby the final utility function is
the sum of all chain-specific utility functions
U(s,B) :=
M∑
k=1
val(s,B, k).
The optimal resource partition strategy is clearly depicted as below.
Definition 5 (Optimal Resource Partition). To a participant with total
storage resource c, its optimal resource partition strategy in the environment
where each chain i has market weight Bi is
o˜pt(c,B) := argmax
s∈DM+1c
U(s,B)
We aim to show that our desired resource partition strategy optimizes the
utility function. That is to have the optimal resource partition equals our desired
one.
10 Shuyang Tang et. al.
Theorem 1. For any c ∈ R+ and any B ∈ DMc ,
o˜pt(c,B) =
c
2
◦
c
2
β
where β = B||B|| .
To prove this theorem, we at first introduce two lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any positive integer n, positive values k, (β1,β2, . . . ,βn) with∑n
i=1 βi = 1, function F (x) := −
∑n
i=1 βi·
xi
kβi+xi
(x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn)) achieves
its minimum in xˆ = ( c2 ,
β1c
2 , . . . ,
βnc
2 ) subject to
– gi(x) := xi − βix0 ≤ 0 for each i ∈ [n],
– gn+i+1(x) := −xi ≤ 0 for each i ∈ [n] ∪ {0},
– h(x) :=
∑n
i=0 xi − c = 0.
Proof. To begin with, we show that F is convex on (R+)n+1. It is easy to observe
that the Hessian matrix of F is diagonal since ∂
2F
∂xi∂xj
= 0 for each i 6= j. Each
element in the diagonal
∂2F
∂x2i
=
2βi
(kβi + xi)2
(
1−
xi
kβi + xi
)
is positive so the Hessian matrix is semi-definite and F is convex on (R+)n+1.
Since F and each gi are convex and h is an affine function, this turns out to be
a convex optimization and any minimal value of F is its minimum. According
to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we only need to show that
– ▽L(xˆ) = 0,
– µigi(xˆ) = 0 for all i ∈ [2n+ 1],
where
L(x) = F (x) +
2n+1∑
i=1
µigi(x) + νh(x) (1)
= −
n∑
i=1
βi ·
xi
kβi + xi
+
n∑
i=1
µi (xi − βix0) + ν
(
n∑
i=0
xi − c
)
, (2)
µi = ν =
k
c(k+c/2) for each i ∈ [n]. For each natural number i ≤ n, µn+i+1 are
set to be zero so
∑2n+1
i=n+1 µigi(x) = 0. In fact,
1. From simple derivations,
∂L(x)
∂x0
=
n∑
i=1
−µiβi + ν =
k
c(k + c2 )
(1−
n∑
i=1
βi) = 0
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and for each i ∈ [n],
∂L(x)
∂xi
= −βi ·
kβi
xi(kβi + xi)
+ µi + ν.
Thereby,
∂L(xˆ)
∂xi
= −βi ·
kβi
βic
2 (kβi +
βic
2 )
+
2k
c(k + c2 )
= −
2k
c(k + c2 )
+
2k
c(k + c2 )
= 0.
As a result, we conclude that ▽L(xˆ) = 0.
2. The second condition is easy to hold since gi(xˆ) = 0 for each i ≤ n and
µi = 0 for each i > n.
Therefore, f achieves its minimum in xˆ.
Intuitively, Lemma. 1 alone has proved Theorem. 1 since by having k = ||B||,
U(s,B) = −F (s)× rω||B||
within the boundary in the lemma. Since the Hessian matrix is semi-definite
either inside the boundary (shown in the lemma proof) or outside the bound-
ary (easy to verify) and U is obviously continuous everywhere and smooth a.e.
except for a subset with zero Lebesgue measure, U is almost convex and the lo-
cal maximization is actually the global optimization. However, to more strictly
prove the theorem, we still require the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any space division strategy on n chains, suppose sA = (sA0 , s
A
1 , . . . , s
A
n ),
if ∃i ∈ [n] : sAi > βis
A
0 , then there always exists another strategy whose utility
is better than sA.
Proof. If there exists i ∈ [n] : sAi > βis
A
0 , then there must exist a set of index
IA = {a1, a2, . . . , aexc} ⊂ [n] where ∀i ∈ I
A, sAi > βis
A
0 and ∀i /∈ I
A, sAi ≤ βis
A
0
both satisfy. Without loss of generality, we assume
sAa1
βa1
≥
sAa2
βa2
≥ . . . ≥
sAaexc
βaexc
> sA0 .
Consider another strategy sA+ = (sA+0 , s
A+
1 , . . . , s
A+
n ). When comparing
sA+ with sA, the new strategy just subtracts some space division from sa1
and adds it to s0. In detail, s
A+ can be formally expressed as
sA+i =

βa1
βa1+1
(sA0 + s
A
a1) i = a1
1
βa1+1
(sA0 + s
A
a1) i = 0
sAi o.w.
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Notice that if sA is a valid space division strategy, then sA+ is also a valid
strategy, as
∑n
i=0 s
A+
i =
∑n
i=0 s
A
i = c.
Now we compare the utility of sAi with that of s
A+
i . Consider the utility
function U for a space division strategy. If we denote the truly effective space
division for chain i as seffi, where
seffi = min{βis0, si}.
Then, it is obvious that the utility function is monotonic for every seffi where
i ∈ [n]. As a result, if ∀i ∈ [n], seffA+i ≥ seff
A
i and ∃i ∈ [n], seff
A+
i > seff
A
i , then
the utility of strategy sA+ is better than that of sA.
In fact, when i = a1, we have seff
A
i = βa1s
A
0 , while seff
A+
i = s
A+
i =
βa1
βa1+1
(sA0 + s
A
a1). Since
sAa1
βa1
> sA0 , it comes out that seff
A+
a1 > seff
A
a1 . When
i ∈ IA and i 6= a1, given that we have assumed s
A
i > βis
A
0 , then seff
A
i = βis
A
0 .
Since
sA+0 =
1
βa1 + 1
(sA0 + s
A
a1) >
1
βa1 + 1
(sA0 + βa1s
A
0 ) = s
A
0 ,
we have
seff
A+
i = min{βis
A+
0 , s
A+
i } > βis
A
0 = seff
A
i .
When i ∈ [n] and i /∈ IA, it is obvious that seffA+i = s
A+
i = s
A
i = seff
A
i . And it
concludes that the utility of sA+ is better than that of sA.
Now we are allowed to prove Theorem. 1.
Proof. We partite DM+1c = D ⊎D
′ into two domains where
D =
{
s ∈ DM+1c |∀i ∈ [M ]. si ≤ βis0
}
.
Lemma. 2 tells that each strategy in D′ can be emulated by a strategy in D.
Therefore, D includes the optimal partition strategy within DM+1c . By having
k = ||B||, U(s,B) = −F (s) × rω||B|| in Lemma. 1 within D and so forth the
optimal strategy among D is our desired partition.
Based on Theorem. 1, we find that the optimization of strategy is indeed in-
dependent from the total resource c. Hence we conclude that for any participant,
the optimal strategy is to divide half resource for the shared proof and divide
the rest part according to the market weight of each chain
opt(β) :=
1
c
o˜pt(c,B) =
1
2
◦
1
2
β.
5.2 System Security
In this part, we show the difficulty of devastating a chain (say, ith chain of market
weight Bi = b) with
b
||B|| = β fraction of total market weight. To devastate
chain i, the adversary should occupy the total market weight with total storage
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resource over αb1. That is to have si = α(b + si) and at the same time (1 +
δ)β′is0 ≥ si where β
′
i =
b+si
||B||+si
. Thereby,
si =
α
1− α
b,
and hence
s0 ≥
si
(1 + δ)β′i
=
si(||B||+ si)
(1 + δ)(b + si)
≥
α
1−αb||B||
(1 + δ)(b+ 1−αα b)
=
α2
(1 + δ)(1 − α)
||B||.
For α > 13 and δ =
1
10 , s0 ≥
5
33 ||B|| > 15%||B||. This tells that regardless of the
market weight of the chain, the adversary has to devote more than 15% global
storage resource (45% to α > 1/2) to devastate a chain with even the slightest
market weight.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel multi-chain scheme from the inherited
merit of proof-of-space.With our framework, the same storage source contributes
simultaneously to multiple blockchains and newly set up blockchains are hard to
be devastated. In the future, we look forward to the flourishing development of
PoC-based blockchains and having our framework implemented on them. Also,
although we have shown to realize this framework via pebbling graph-styled
proof-of-space schemes, we also expect its application on PoC schemes of other
styles.
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Protocol Πmain
Shared protocol Πmain is executed by all participants P1, P2, . . . , PN . We assume a public-key
infrastructure Fcert.
This functionality is parameterized by the number of candidates N (this is a variant in
the permissionless setting, but we take this notation for the simplicity of descriptions), the
number of adversary controlled parties t. A predetermined parameter lsize describes the
number of leaders to be elected for a round which varies among different emulations of the
functionality. H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is a hash function.
– System Setup.
• Each participant from Fcert fetch their key pairs (pkj , skj). To facilitate descriptions, we
denote pk−1j := skj .
• Each initially launched chain contains ∆ start-up blocks, specifically, Aik for chain i and
block k.
• Each participant j divides its total resource into sj .
• Each participant j for each chain i generates (γji , γ˜
j
i )← ΠPoC.init
H(sji ).
• Each participant j issues the resource commitment
com
j := (pkj , s
j ,γj = (γj1, γ
j
2 , . . . , γ
j
M ))pk−1
j
.
• Prepare a set Γ of γ’s, initially set as empty. Prepare a map J from public key pk to
commitment com.
Each round (round R) proceeds as follows.
– Block Proposal.
• Find the current chain branch in view with the greatest total weight (Ai1, A
i
2, . . . , A
i
R+∆−1).
• Calculate the expected market weight of each chain, namely, Bi := µ
∑R+∆−1
k=R weight(A
i
k)
for chain i, let β := B
||B||
.
• Each participant j for each chain i assembles its own block for the round.
ÂiR+∆ :=

pkj , rec,H(AiR+∆−1), τ ji , τ ji ′,weight =
(
H(τ ji )
2λ
)1/s˜j
i
, comj


pk
−1
j
,
where s˜ji := min{s
j
i , (1 + δ)βis
j
0}, τ
j
i , τ
j
i ′ are two opens τ
j
i ← ΠPoC.open
H
(
s
j
i , γ˜
j
i ,H(τAi
R
)
)
,
τ ji ′ ← ΠPoC.open
H
(
s
j
0, γ˜
j
0,H(τAi
R
)
)
and rec has already included all newly appended trans-
actions and the block reward.
Here, for a block A = (pk, rec, hash, τ,w, com), weight(A) := w and τA := τ .
• After the assembly,
(
ÂiR+∆
)
pk
−1
j
is proposed.
– Chain Growth.
• Parse every received block into ÂiR+∆ →
(
pk, rec,H(AiR+∆−1
)
, τi, τi′,weight, com), firstly
verify the calculation of weight, integrity of rec, the hash, and the signature. For a block
passing the above verification, add it into the current view of block branches if passing
through the following verifications:
1. Parse com →
(
pk′, s,γ = {γi}i∈[M]
)
, check pk′
?
= pk.
2. Check ΠPoC.vrf
H
(
si, γi,H(τAi
R
), τi
)
and ΠPoC.vrf
H
(
s0, γ0, H(τAi
R
), τi′
)
.
3. Check whether each two elements in Γ are different.
4. Check whether (pk, com) /∈ J and for each γi, it holds γi /∈ Γ . Reject if the above
condition is not satisfied.
5. Update J := J ⊎ {(pk, com)} and Γ := Γ ⊎ γ.
Fig. 3. The Main Protocol
